Component-based software development has posed a serious challenge to system verification since externally-obtained components could be a new source of system failures. This issue can not be completely solved by either model-checking or traditional software testing techniques alone due to several reasons: (1) externally obtained components are usually unspecified/partially specified; (2) it is generally difficult to establish adequacy criteria for testing a component; (3) components may be used to dynamically upgrade a system. This paper introduces a new approach (called modelchecking driven black-box testing) that combines model-checking with traditional black-box software testing to tackle the problem in a complete, sound, and automatic way. The idea is to, with respect to some requirement (expressed in CTL or LTL) about the system, use model-checking techniques to derive a condition (expressed in a communication/witness graph) for an unspecified component such that the system satisfies the requirement iff the condition is satisfied by the component. The condition's satisfiability can be established by testing the component with test-cases generated from the condition on-the-fly. In this paper, we present algorithms for model-checking driven black-box testing, which handle both CTL and LTL requirements for systems with unspecified components. We also illustrate the ideas through some examples.
INTRODUCTION
Component-based software development [21, 7] is a systematic engineering method to build software systems from prefabricated software components that are previously developed by the same organization, provided by third-party software vendors, or even purchased as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products. Though this development method has gained great popularity in recent years, it has also posed serious challenges to the quality assurance issue of component-based software since externally obtained components could be a new source of system failures. The issue is of vital importance to safety-critical and mission-critical systems. For instance, in June 1996, during the maiden voyage of the Ariane 5 launch vehicle, the launcher veered off course and exploded less than one minute after taking off. The report [25] of the Inquiry Board indicates that the disaster resulted from insufficiently tested software reused from the Ariane 4. The developers had reused certain Ariane 4 software component in the Ariane 5 without substantially testing it in the new system, having assumed that there were no significant differences in these portions of the two systems.
Most of the current work addresses the issue from the viewpoint of component developers: how to ensure the quality of components before they are released. However, this view is obviously insufficient: an extensively tested component (by the vendor) may still not perform as expected in a specific deployment environment, since the systems where a component could be deployed may be quite different and diverse and they may not be tried out by its vendor. So, we look at this issue from system developers' point of view: (*) how to ensure that a component functions correctly in the host system where the component is deployed.
In practice, testing is almost the most natural resort to resolve this issue. When integrating a component into a system, system developers may have three options for testing: (1) trust the component provider's claim that the component has undergone thorough testing and then go ahead to use it; (2) extensively retest the component alone; (3) hook the component with the system and conduct integration testing. Unfortunately, all of the three options have some serious limitations. Obviously, for systems requiring high reliability, the first option is totally out of the question. The second option may suffer from the following fact. Software components are generally built with multiple sets of functionality [16] , and indiscriminately testing all the functionality of a software component is not only expensive but sometimes also infeasible, considering the potentially huge state space of the component interface. Additionally, it is usually difficult to know when the testing over the component is adequate. The third option is not always applicable. This is because, in many applications, software components could be applied for dynamic upgrading or extending a running system [35] that is costly or not supposed to shut down for retesting at all. Even without all the above limitations, purely testing-based strategies are still not sufficient to establish the solid confidence for a reliable component required by mission-critical or safety-critical systems, where formal methods like model-checking are highly desirable. However, one fundamental obstacle for using a formal method to address the issue of (*) is that design details or source code of an externally obtained software component is generally not fully available to the developers of its host system. Thus, existing formal verification techniques (like model-checking) are not directly applicable.
Clearly, this problem plagues both component-based software systems and some hardware systems with a modularized design. Generally, we call such systems as systems with unspecified components (in fact, in most cases, the components are partially specified to which our approach still applies.).
In this paper, we present a new approach, called model-checking driven black-box testing, which combines model-checking techniques and black-box testing techniques to deal with this problem. The idea is simple yet novel: with respect to some temporal requirement about a system with an unspecified component, a modelchecking based technique is used to derive automatically a condition about the unspecified component from the rest of the system. This condition guarantees that the system satisfies the requirement iff the condition is satisfied by the unspecified component, which can be checked by adequate black-box testing over the unspecified component with test-cases generated automatically from the condition.
We provide algorithms for both LTL and CTL model-checking driven black-box testing. In the algorithms, the condition mentioned earlier is represented as communication graphs and witness graphs, on which a bounded and nested depth-first search procedure is employed to run black-box testing over the unspecified component. Our algorithms are both sound and complete.
Though we do not have an exact complexity analysis result, our preliminary studies show that, in the liveness testing algorithm for LTL, the maximal length of test-cases run on the component is bounded by O(n · m 2 ). For CTL, the length is bounded by O(k · n · m 2 ). In here, k is the number of CTL operators in the formula to be verified, n is the state number in the host system, and m is the state number in the component.
The advantages of our approach are obvious: a stronger confidence about the reliability of the system can be established through both formal verification and adequate functional testing; system developers can customize the testing with respect to some specific system properties; intermediate model-checking results (the communication and witness graphs) can be reused to avoid (repetitive) integration testing when the component is updated, if only the new component's interface remains the same; our algorithms are both sound and complete; most of all, the whole process can be carried our in an automatic way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on temporal logics LTL and CTL along with our model of systems containing unspecified components. The main body of the paper consists of Section 3 and Section 4, which propose algorithms for LTL and CTL model-checking driven blackbox testing, respectively, over the system model. Section 5 illustrates the algorithms through an example. Section 6 lists some of the related work. Section 7 concludes the paper with some further issues to be resolved in the future.
Details on some algorithms are omitted in this extended abstract. At http://www.eecs.wsu.edu/∼gxie, a full version of this paper is available.
PRELIMINARIES

The System Model
In this paper, we consider systems with only one unspecified component (the algorithms generalize to systems with multiple unspecified components). Such a system is denoted by
where M is the host system and X is the unspecified component. Both M and X are finite-state transition systems communicating synchronously with each other via a finite set of input and output symbols.
Formally, the unspecified component X is defined as a deterministic Mealy machine whose internal structure is unknown (but an implementation of X is available for testing). We write X as a triple Σ, ∇, m , where Σ is the set of X's input symbols, ∇ is the set of X's output symbols, and m is an upper bound for the number of states in X (as a convention in black-box testing, the m is given). Assume that X has an initial state sinit. A run of X is a sequence of symbols alternately in Σ and ∇: α0β0α1β1..., such that, starting from the initial state sinit, X outputs exactly the sequence β0β1... when it is given the sequence α0α1... as input. In this case, we say that the input sequence is accepted by X.
The host system M is defined as a 5-tuple
where • S is a finite set of states;
• Γ is a finite set of events;
• Renv ⊆ S × Γ × S defines a set of environment transitions where (s, a, s ′ ) ∈ Renv means that M moves from state s to state s ′ upon receiving an event (symbol) a ∈ Γ from the outside environment;
• Rcomm ⊆ S × Σ × ∇ × S defines a set of communication transitions where (s, α, β, s ′ ) ∈ Rcomm means that M moves from state s to state s ′ when X outputs a symbol β ∈ ∇ after M sends X an input symbol α ∈ Σ; and,
Without loss of generality, we further assume that, there is only one transition between any two states in M (but M , in general, could still be nondeterministic).
An execution path of the system Sys = M, X can be represented as a (potentially infinite) sequence τ of states and symbols, s0c0s1c1..., where each si ∈ S, each ci is either a symbol in Γ or a pair αiβi (called a communication) with αi ∈ Σ and βi ∈ ∇. Additionally, τ satisfies the following requirements:
• s0 is an initial state of M , i.e., s0 ∈ I;
• for each ci ∈ Γ, (si, ci, si+1) is an environment transition of M ;
• for each ci = αiβi, (si, αi, βi, si+1) is a communication transition of M .
The communication trace of τ , denoted by τX , is the sequence obtained from τ by retaining only symbols in Σ and ∇ (i.e., the result of projecting τ onto Σ and ∇). For any given state s ∈ S, we say that the system Sys can reach s iff Sys has an execution path τ on which s appears and τX (if not empty) is also a run of X.
In the case when X is fully specified, the system can be regarded as an I/O automaton [26] .
Model-checking
Model-checking [9, 33, 10, 36, 20] is an automatic technique for verifying a finite-state system against some temporal specification. The system is usually represented by a Kripke structure K = S, R, L over a set of atomic propositions AP , where
• S is a finite set of states;
• R ⊆ S × S is the (total) transition relation;
AP is a function that labels each state with the set of atomic propositions that are true in the state.
The temporal specification can be expressed in, among others, a branching-time temporal logic (CTL) or a linear-time temporal logic (LTL). Both CTL and LTL formulas are composed of path quantifiers A and E, which denote "for all paths" and "there exists a path", respectively, and temporal operators X, F , U and G, which stands for "next state", "eventually", "until", and "always", respectively.
More specifically, CTL formulas are defined as follows:
• Constants true and f alse, and every atomic proposition in AP are CTL formulas;
• If f1 and f2 are CTL formulas, then so are ¬f1, f1
Due to duality, any CTL formula can be expressed in terms of ¬, ∨, EX, EU and EG. A CTL model-checking problem, formulated as
, is to check whether the CTL formula f is true at a state s. For example, AF f is true at state s if f will be eventually true on all paths from s; E[f U g] is true at state s if there exists a path from s on which f is true at each step until g becomes true.
LTL formulas, on the other hand, are all in the form of A f where f is a path formula defined as follows:
• Constants true and f alse, and every atomic proposition in AP are path formulas;
• If f1 and f2 are path formulas, then so are ¬f1, f1
An LTL model-checking problem, formulated as
, is to check whether the path formula f is true on all paths from a state s. For example, AF G f is true at s if on all paths from s, after a future point f will be always true; AGF f is true at s if on all paths from s, f will be true infinitely often.
More detailed background in model-checking and temporal logics can be found in the textbook [11] . The system Sys = M, X defined earlier can be understood as a Kripke structure (with a given labeling function and atomic propositions over states in M ). Since X is an unspecified component, in the rest of the paper, we mainly focus on how to solve the LTL/CTL model-checking problems on the Sys through black-box testing on X.
Black-box Testing
Black-box testing (also called functional testing) is a technique to test a system without knowing its internal structure. The system is regarded as a "black-box" in the sense that its behaviour can only be determined by observing (i.e., testing) its input/output sequences. As a common assumption in black-box testing, the unspecified component X (treated as a black-box) has a special input symbol reset which always makes X return to its initial state regardless of its current state. We use Experiment(X, resetπ) to denote the output sequence obtained from the input sequence π, when X runs from the initial state (caused by the reset). After running this Experiment, suppose that we continue to run X by providing an input symbol α following the sequence π. Corresponding to this α, we may obtain an output symbol β from X. We use Experiment(X, α) to denote the β. Notice that this latter Experiment is a shorthand for "the last output symbol in Experiment(X, resetπα)".
Studies have shown that if only an upper bound for the number of states in the system and the system's inputs set are known, then its (equivalent) internal structure can be fully recovered through black-box testing. Clearly, a naive algorithm to solve the LTL/CTL model-checking problem over the Sys is to first recover the full structure of the component X through testing, and then to solve the classic model-checking problem over the fully specified system composed from M and the recovered X. Notice that, in the naive algorithm, when we perform black-box testing over X, the selected test-cases have nothing to do with the host system M . Therefore, it is desirable to find more sophisticated algorithms such as the ones discussed in this paper, that only select "useful" test-cases wrt the M as well as the temporal specification of M that needs to be checked.
LTL MODEL-CHECKING DRIVEN BLACK-BOX TESTING
In this section, we introduce algorithms for LTL model-checking driven black-box testing for the system Sys = M, X defined earlier. We first show how to solve a liveness analysis problem. Then, we discuss the general LTL model-checking problem.
Liveness Analysis
The liveness analysis problem (also called the infinite-often problem) is to check: starting from some initial state s0 ∈ I, whether the system Sys can reach a given state s f for infinitely many times.
When M has no communications with the unspecified component X, solving the problem is equivalent to finding a path p that runs from s0 to s f and a loop C that passes s f . However, as far as communications are involved, the problem gets more complicated. The existence of the path p does not ensure that the system can indeed reach s f from s0 (e.g., communications with X may never allow the system to take the necessary transitions to reach s f ). Moreover, the existence of the loop C does not guarantee that the system can run along C forever either (e.g., after running along C for three rounds, the system may be forced to leave C by the communications with X).
We approach this infinite-often problem in three steps. First, we look at whether a definite answer to the problem is possible. If we can find a path from s0 to s f and a loop from s f to s f that involve only environment transitions, then the original problem (i.e., the infinite-often problem) is definitely true. If such a path and a loop, no matter what transitions they may involve, do not exist at all, then the original problem is definitely false. If no definite answer is possible, we construct a directed graph G and use it to generate test-cases for the unspecified component X. The graph G, called a communication graph, is a subgraph of M , represents all paths and loops in M that could witness the truth of the problem (i.e., paths that run from s0 to s f and loops that pass s f ). The graph G is defined as a pair N, E , where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges. Each edge of G is annotated either by a pair αβ that denotes a communication of M with X, or has no annotation. We construct G as follows.
• Add one node to G for each state in M that is involved in some path between s0 and s f or in a loop that passes s f ;
• Add one edge between two nodes in N if M has a transition between two states corresponding to the two nodes respectively. If the transition involves a communication with X, then annotate the edge with the communication symbols.
It is easy to see that the liveness analysis problem is true if and only if the truth is witnessed by a path in G. Therefore, the last step is to check whether G has a path along which the system can reach s f from s0 first and then reach s f for infinitely many times. More details of this step are addressed in the next subsection. See appendix B.1 for details on the above operations.
Liveness Testing
To check whether the constructed communication graph G has a path that witnesses the truth of the original problem, the straightforward way is to try out all paths in G and then check, whether along some path, the system can reach s f from s0 first and then reach s f for infinitely many times. The check is done by testing X with the communication trace of the path to see whether it is a run of X. However, one difficulty is that G may contain loops, and certainly we can only test X with a finite communication trace. Fortunately, the following observations are straightforward:
• To check whether the system can reach s f from s0, we only need to consider paths with length less than mn1 where n1 is the maximal number of communications on all simple paths (i.e., no loops on the path) between s0 and s f in G, and m is an upper bound for the number of states in the unspecified component X;
• To check whether the system can reach from s f to s f for infinitely many times, we only need to make sure that the system can reach s f for m − 1 times, and between s f and s f , the system goes through a path no longer than n2 that is the maximal number of communications on all simple loops (i.e., no nested loops along the loop) in G that pass s f .
Let n = max(n1, n2). The following procedure T estLiveness uses a bounded and nested depth-first search to traverse the graph G while testing X. It first tests whether the system can reach s f from s0 along a path with length less than mn, then it tests whether the system can further reach s f to s f for m − 1 more times. The algorithm maintains a sequence of input symbols that has been successfully accepted by X, an integer variable level that records how many communications have been gone through without reaching s f , and an integer variable count that indicates how many times s f has been reached. At each step, it chooses one candidate from the set of all possible input symbols at a node, and feeds the input sequence concatenated with the candidate input symbol to X. If the candidate input symbol and the output symbol (corresponding to the candidate input symbol) of X match the annotation of an edge originating from the node, the procedure moves forward to try the destination node of the edge with level increased by 1. If there is no match, then the procedure tries other candidates. But before trying any other candidate, we need to bring X to its initial state by sending it the special input symbol reset. The procedure returns f alse when all candidates are tried without a match, or when more than mn communications have been gone through without reaching s f . After s f is reached, the procedure increases count by 1 and resets level to 0. The procedure returns true when it has already encountered s f for m times.
Procedure T estLiveness(X, π, s0, s f , level, count) If level > mn Then Return f alse; Else If s0 = s f Then If count >= m Then Return true;
Return f alse. In summary, our liveness testing algorithm to solve the liveness analysis problem has two steps: (1) build the communication graph G; (2) return the truth of T estLiveness(X, reset, s0, s f , level = 0, count = 0).
LTL Model-Checking Driven Testing
Recall that the LTL model-checking problem is, for a Kripke structure K = S, R, L with a state s ∈ S and a path formula f , to determine if K, s |= A f . Notice that K, s |= A f if and only if K, s |= ¬E ¬f . Therefore it is sufficient to only consider formulas in the form E f . The standard LTL model-checking algorithm [11] first constructs a tableau T for the path formula f . T is also a Kripke structure and includes every path that satisfies f . Then the algorithm composes T with K and obtains another Kripke structure P which includes exactly the set of paths that are in both T and K. Thus, a state in K satisfies E f if and only if it is the start of a path (in the composition P ) that satisfies f .
Define sat(f ) to be the set of states in T that satisfy f and use the convention that (s, s ′ ) ∈ sat(f ) if and only if s ′ ∈ sat(f ). The LTL model-checking problem can be summarized by the following theorem [11] :
Note that the standard LTL model-checking algorithm still applies to the system Sys = M, X , although it contains an unspecified component X. To see this, the construction of the tableau T from f and the definition of sat are not affected by the unspecified component X. The composition of Sys and T is a new system Sys ′ = P, X where P is the composition of M and T . Then one can show COROLLARY 1. M, X , s |= E f if and only if there is a state
Obviously, checking whether there is a state s ′ in T such that (s, s ′ ) ∈ sat(f ) is trivial. To check whether P, X , (s, s ′ ) |= EG true under the fairness constraints is equivalent to checking whether there is computation in P, X that starts from (s, s ′ ) and on which the fairness constraints are true infinitely often. One can show that this is equivalent to the liveness analysis problem we studied in the previous subsection, and thus, the LTL modelchecking problem can be solved by extending our algorithms for the liveness analysis problem. Moreover, the algorithms are both complete and sound.
CTL MODEL-CHECKING DRIVEN BLACK-BOX TESTING
In this section, we introduce algorithms for CTL model-checking driven black-box testing for the system Sys = M, X .
Ideas
Recall that the CTL model-checking problem is, for a Kripke structure K = (S, R, L), a state s0 ∈ S, and a CTL formula f , to check whether K, s0 |= f holds. The standard algorithm [11] for this problem operates by searching the structure and, during the search, labeling each state s with the set of subformulas of f that are true at s. Initially, labels of s are just L(s). Then, the algorithm goes through a series of stages-during the i-th stage, subformulas with the (i − 1)-nested CTL operators are processed. When a subformula is processed, it is added to the labels for each state where the subformula is true. When all the stages are completed, the algorithm returns true when s0 is labeled with f , or f alse otherwise.
However, if a system is not completely specified, the standard algorithm does not work. This is because, in the system Sys = M, X , transitions of M may depend on communications with the unspecified component X. In this section, we adapt the standard CTL model-checking algorithm [11] to handle the system Sys (i.e., to check whether M, X , s0 |= f holds where s0 is an initial state in M and f is a CTL formula over M ).
The new algorithm follows a structure similar to the standard one. It also goes through a series of stages to search M 's state space and label each state during the search. However, during a stage, processing the subformulas is rather involved, since the truth of a subformula h at a state s can not be simply decided (it may depend on communications). Similar to the algorithm for the liveness analysis problem, our ideas here are to construct a graph representing all the paths that witness the truth of h at s. But, the new algorithm is far more complicated than the liveness testing algorithm for LTL, since the truth of a CTL formula is usually witnessed by a tree instead of a single path. In the new algorithm, processing each subformula h is sketched as follows.
When h takes the form of EX g, E[g1 U g2], or EG g, we construct a graph that represents exactly all the paths that witness the truth of h at some state. We call such a graph the subformula's witness graph (WG), written as h . We also call h an EX graph, an EU graph, or an EG graph if h takes the form of EX g, E[g1 U g2], or EG g, respectively.
Let k be the total number of CTL operators in f . In the algorithm, we construct k WGs, and for each WG, we assign it with a unique ID number that ranges between 2 and k + 1. (The ID number 1 is reserved for constant true.) Let I be the mapping from the WGs to their IDs; i.e., I( h ) denotes the ID number of h's witness graph, and I −1 (i) denotes the witness graph with i as its ID number, 1 < i ≤ k + 1. We label a state s with ID number 1 if h is true at s and the truth does not depend on communications between M and X. Otherwise, we label s with 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 if h could be true at s and the truth would be witnessed only by some paths which start from s in I −1 (i) and, on which, communications are involved.
When h takes the form of a Boolean combination of subformulas using ¬ and ∨, the truth of h at state s is also a logic combination of the truths of the component subformulas at the same state. To this end, we label the state with an ID expression ψ defined as follows:
Let Ψ denote the set of all ID expressions. For each subformula h, we construct a labeling (partial) function L h : S → Ψ to record the ID expression labeled to each state during the processing of the subformula h, and the labeling function is returned when the subformula is processed.
The detailed procedure, called P rocessCT L, for processing subformulas will be given in Section 4.2. After all subformulas are processed, a labeling function L f for the outer-most subformula (i.e., f itself) is returned. The algorithm returns true when s is labeled with 1 by L f . It returns f alse when s is not labeled at all. In other cases, a testing procedure over X is applied to check whether the ID expression labeled in L f (s) could be evaluated true. The procedure, called T estW G, will be given in Section 4.3. In summary, the algorithm (to solve the CTL model-checking problem M, X , s0 |= f ) is sketched as follows:
Return T estW G(X, reset, s0, L f (s0)); Else (i.e., s0 is not labeled at all) Return f alse.
Processing a CTL formula
Processing a CTL formula h is implemented through a recursive procedure P rocessCT L. Recall that any CTL formula can be expressed in terms of ∨, ¬, EX, EU , and EG. Thus, at each intermediate step of the procedure, depending on whether the formula h is atomic or takes one of the following forms: g1 ∨ g2, ¬g, EX g, E[g1 U g2], or EG g, the procedure has only six cases to consider and when it finishes, a labeling function L h is returned for formula h.
Procedure P rocessCT L(M, h)
Case h is atomic: Let L h label every state with 1 whenever h is true on the state; h = g1 ∨ g2:
s)).
When h = ¬g, we first process g by calling P rocessCT L, then construct a labeling function L h for h by "negating" (i.e., HandleN egation, see Appendix B.3 for details)) g's labeling function Lg as follows:
• For every state s that is not in the domain of Lg, let L h label s with 1;
• For each state s that is in the domain of Lg but not labeled with 1 by Lg, let L h label s with ID expression ¬Lg(s).
The remaining three cases (i.e., for EX, EU , and EG) in the above procedure are more complicated and are handled in the following three subsections respectively.
Handling EX
When h = EXg, g is processed first by P rocessCT L. Then, the procedure HandleEX is called with g's labeling function Lg to construct a labeling function L h and create a witness graph for h (we assume that, whenever a witness graph is created, the current value of a global variable id, which initially is 2, is assigned as the ID number of the graph, and id is incremented by 1 after it is assigned to the graph).
The labeling function L h is constructed as follows. For each state s that has a successor s ′ in the domain of Lg, if s can reach s ′ through an environment transition and s ′ is labeled with 1 by Lg then let L h also label s with 1, otherwise let L h label s with the current value of the global variable id.
The witness graph for h = EXg, called an EX graph, is created as a triple:
where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of annotated edges. It is created as follows:
• Add one node to N for each state that is in the domain of Lg.
• Add one node to N for each state that has a successor in the domain of Lg.
• Add one edge between two nodes in N to E when M has a transition between two states corresponding to the two nodes respectively; if the transition involves a communication with X then annotate the edge with the communication symbols.
When HandleEX finishes, it increases the global variable id by 1 (since one new witness graph has been created). See Appendix B.4 for details.
Handling EU
The case when h = E [g1 U g2] is more complicated. We first process g1 and g2 respectively by calling P rocessCT L, then call procedure 
where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges. N is constructed by adding one node for each state that is in the domain of L h , while E is constructed in the same way as that of HandleEX. When HandleEU finishes, it increases the global variable id by 1.
See Appendix B.5 for details.
Handling EG
To handle formula h = EGg, we first process g by calling P rocessCT L, then call procedure HandleEG with g's labeling function Lg to construct a labeling function L h and create a witness graph for h.
The labeling function L h is constructed as follows. For each state s that can reach a loop C through a path p such that every state (including s) on p and C is in the domain of Lg, if every state (including s) on p and C is labeled with 1 by Lg and no communications are involved on the path and the loop, then let L h also label s with 1, otherwise let L h label s with the current value of the global variable id.
The witness graph for h, called an EG graph, is created as a triple:
where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of annotated edges. The graph is constructed in a same way as that of HandleEU . When HandleEG finishes, it also increases the global variable id by 1.
See Appendix B.6 for details.
Testing a Witness Graph
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the procedure for CTL modelchecking driven black-box testing, CheckCT L, consists of two parts. The first part, which was discussed in Section 4.2, includes P rocessCT L that processes CTL formulas and creates witness graphs. The second part is to evaluate the created witness graphs through testing X. We will elaborate on this second part in this section.
In processing the CTL formula f , a witness graph is constructed for each CTL operator in f and a labeling function is constructed for each subformula of f . As seen from the algorithm CheckCT L (at the end of Section 4.1), the algorithm either gives a definite "yes" or "no" answer to the CTL model-checking problem, i.e., M, X , s0 |= f , or it reduces the problem to checking whether the ID expression ψ labeled to s0 can be evaluated true at the state. The evaluation procedure is carried out by the following recursive procedure T estW G, after an input sequence π has been accepted by the unspecified component X.
Procedure T estW G(X, π, s0, ψ)
Case ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2: If T estW G(X, π, s0, ψ1) Then Return true; Else Return T estW G(X, π, s0, ψ2) ψ = ¬ψ1:
Return ¬T estW G(X, π, s0, ψ1) ψ = 1: Return true; ψ = i with 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1:
In T estW G, the first three cases are straightforward, which are consistent with the intended meaning of ID expressions. The cases T estEX, T estEU, T estEG for evaluating EX, EU , EG graphs are discussed in the following three subsections.
T estEX
The case for checking whether an EX graph G = N, E, Lg can be evaluated true at a state s0 is simple. We just test whether the system M can reach from s0 to another state s ′ ∈ dom(Lg) through a transition in G such that the ID expression Lg(s ′ ) can be evaluated true at s ′ . See Appendix B.7 for details.
T estEU
To check whether an EU graph G = N, E, Lg 1 , Lg 2 can be evaluated true at a state s0, we need to traverse all paths p in G with length less than mn and test the unspecified component X to see whether the system can reach some state s ′ ∈ dom(Lg 2 ) through one of those paths. In here, m is an upper bound for the number of states in the unspecified component X and n is the maximal number of communications on all simple paths between s0 and s ′ . In the meantime, we should also check whether Lg 2 (s ′ ) can be evaluated true at s ′ and whether Lg 1 (si) can be evaluated true at si for each si on p (excluding s ′ ) by calling T estW G. See Appendix B.8 for details.
T estEG
For the case to check whether an EG graph G = N, E, Lg can be evaluated true at a state s0, we need to find an infinite path in G along which the system can run forever.
The following procedure T estEG first decomposes G into a set of SCCs. Then, for each state s f in the SCCs, it calls another procedure SubT estEG to test whether the system can reach s f from s0 along a path not longer than mn, as well as whether the system can further reach s f from s f for m−1 times. The basic idea of SubT estEG (see Appendix B.9 for details) is similar to that of the T estLiveness algorithm in Section 3.2, except that we need also check whether Lg(si) can be evaluated true at si for each state si that has been reached so far by calling T estW G. Here, m is the same as before while n is the maximal number of communications on all simple paths between s0 and s f .
Procedure T estEG(X, π, s0, G = N, E, Lg ) SCC := {C|C is a nontrivial SCC of G}; T := C∈SCC {s|s ∈ C}; For each s ∈ T Do Experiment(X, resetπ); If SubT estEG(X, π, s0, s, G, level = 0, count = 0); Return true; Return f alse. In summary, to solve the CTL model-checking problem (M, X), s0 |= f, our algorithm CheckCT L in Section 4.1 either gives a definite yes/no answer or gives a sufficient and necessary condition in the form of ID expressions and witness graphs. The condition is evaluated through black-box testing over the unspecified component X. The evaluation process will terminate with a yes/no answer to the model-checking problem. One can show that our algorithm is both complete and sound.
EXAMPLES
In this section, to better understand our algorithms, we look at some examples 1 . Consider a system Sys = M, X where M keeps receiving messages from the outside environment and then transmits the message through the unspecified component X. The only event symbol in M is msg, while X has two input symbols send and ack, and two output symbols yes and no. The transition graph of M is depicted in Figure 1 where we use a suffix ? to denote events from the outside environment (e.g., msg?), and use a infix / to denote communications of M with X (e.g., send/yes).
Assume that we want to solve the following LTL model-checking problem (M, X), s0 |= EGF s2
i.e., starting from the initial state s0, the system can reach state s1 infinitely often. Applying our liveness analysis algorithms, we can obtain the (minimized) communication graph in Figure 2 . is a run of X, where m is an upper bound for number of states in X. Now, we slightly modified the transition graph of M into Figure 3 such that when a send fails, the system shall return to the initial state. From Figure 4 and the liveness testing algorithms, the system satisfies the liveness property iff there exist 0 ≤ k1, k2 ≤ 2m such that the communication trace (send no) k 1 send yes((send yes ack yes)(send no)
is a run of X. Still consider the system in Figure 3 , but we want to solve a CTL model-checking problem (M, X), s0 |= AF s2; i.e., along all paths from s0, the system can reach state s1 eventually. The problem is equivalent to (M, X), s0 |= ¬EG¬s2.
Applying our CTL algorithms to formula h = EG¬s2, we construct an EG witness graph G = N, E, Ltrue whose ID number is 2 and a labeling function L h , where Ltrue labels all three states s0,s1, and s3 with ID expression 1 (as defined in Section 4.1, which stands for true), and L h labels all three states s0, s1, and s3 with 2. The graph G is depicted in Figure 5 . From this graph as well as L h , the algorithms conclude that the model-checking problem is true iff the communication trace (send no) m−1 is not a run of X. s1 send/no s0 s3
Figure 5
Now we modify the system in Figure 1 into a more complicated one shown in Figure 6 . For this system, we want to check
i.e., starting from the initial state s0, the system should never reach state s3 earlier than it reaches s2. Applying our CTL algorithms to formula
we obtain an EU witness graph G = N, E, L1, L2 whose ID number is 2 and a labeling function L h , where L1 labels all four states s0, s1, s3 and s4 with 1, L2 just labels s3 with 1, and L h labels states s0, s1, and s4 with 2, and labels s3 with 1. The graph G is depicted in Figure 7 . From this graph as well as L h , the algorithms conclude that the model-checking problem is true iff none of communication traces in the form of send no(ack yes send no) * and with length less than 3m is a run of X. For the same system, we could consider more complicated temporal properties as follows:
• (M, X) |= AG(s2 → AF s3); i.e., starting from the initial state s0, whenever the system reaches s2, it would eventually reach s3.
• (M, X), s0 |= AG(s2 → AXA[¬s2U s3]); i.e., starting from the initial state s0, whenever it reaches state s2, the system should never reach s2 again until it reaches s3.
We do not include the witness graphs and labeling functions for these two cases in this extended abstract. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the two problems are true iff no communication traces with two consecutive symbol pairs (send yes) can be runs of X. See Appendix C.1 and Appendix C.2 for details about the above two examples.
RELATED WORK
The quality assurance problem for component-based software has attracted lots of attention in the software engineering community, as witnessed by recent publications in conferences like ICSE and FSE. However, most of the work is based on the traditional testing techniques and considers the problem from the viewpoint of component developers; i.e., how to ensure the quality of components before they are released.
Voas [37, 38] proposed a component certification strategy with the establishment of independent certification laboratories performing extensive testing of components and then publishing the results. Technically, this approach would not provide much improvement for solving the problem, since independent certification laboratories can not ensure the sufficiency of their testing either, and a testing-based technique alone is not enough to a reliable software component. Some researchers [34, 28] suggested an approach to augment a component with additional information to increase the customer's understanding and analyzing capability of the component behavior. A related approach [39] is to automatically extract a finite-state machine model from the interface of a software component, which is delivered along with the component. This approach can provide some convenience for customers to test the component, but again, how much a customer should test is still a big problem. To address the issue of testing adequacy, Rosenblum defined in [32] a conceptual basis for testing component-based software, by introducing two notions of C-adequate-for-P and C-adequate-for-M (with respect to certain adequacy criteria) for adequate unit testing of a component and adequate integration testing for a componentbased system, respectively. But this is still a purely testing-based strategy. In practice, how to establish the adequacy criteria is an unclear issue.
Recently, Bertolino et. al. [5] recognized the importance of testing a software component in its deployment environment. They developed a framework that supports functional testing of a software component with respect to customer's specification, which also provides a simple way to enclose with a component the developer's test suites which can be re-executed by the customer. Yet their approach requires the customer to have a complete specification about the component to be incorporated into a system, which is not always possible. McCamant and Ernst [27] considered the issue of predicting the safety of dynamic component upgrade, which is part of the problem we consider. But their approach is completely different since they try to generate some abstract operational expectation about the new component through observing a system's run-time behavior with the old component.
In the formal verification area, there has been a long history of research on verification of systems with modular structure (called modular verification [31] ). A key idea [23, 18] in modular verification is the assume-guarantee paradigm: A module should guarantee to have the desired behavior once the environment with which the module is interacting has the assumed behavior. There have been a variety of implementations for this idea (see, e.g., [2] ). However, the assume-guarantee idea does not immediately fit with our problem setup since it requires that users must have clear assumptions about a module's environment.
In the past decade, there has also been some research on combining model-checking and testing techniques for system verification, which can be classified into a broader class of techniques called specification-based testing. But most of the work only utilizes model-checkers' ability of generating counter-examples from a system's specification to produce test cases against an implementation [8, 19, 13, 15, 4, 6, 3] .
Peled et. al. [30, 17, 29] studied the issue of checking a blackbox against a temporal property (called black-box checking). But their focus is on how to efficiently establish an abstract model of the black-box through black-box testing , and their approach requires a clearly-defined property (LTL formula) about the blackbox, which is not always possible in component-based systems. Kupferman and Vardi [22] investigated module checking by considering the problem of checking an open finite-state system under all possible environments. Module checking is different from the problem in (*) mentioned at the beginning of the paper in the sense that a component understood as an environment in [22] is a specific one. Fisler et. al. [14, 24] proposed an idea of deducing a model-checking condition for extension features from the base feature, which is adopted to study model-checking feature-oriented software designs. Their approach relies totally on model-checking techniques; their algorithms have false negatives and do not handle LTL formulas.
DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we present algorithms for LTL and CTL modelchecking driven black-box testing. The algorithms create communication graphs and witness graphs, on which a bounded and nested depth-first search procedure is employed to run black-box testing over the unspecified component. Our algorithms are both sound and complete. Though we do not have an exact complexity analysis result, our preliminary studies show that, in the liveness testing algorithm for LTL, the maximal length of test-cases fed into the unspecified component X is bounded by O(n · m 2 ). For CTL, the length is bounded by O(k · n · m 2 ). In here, k is the number of CTL operators in the formula to be verified, n is the state number in the host system, and m is the state number in the component.
The next natural step is to implement the algorithms and see how well they work in practice. In the implementation, there are further issues to be addressed.
Practical Efficiency
Similar to the traditional black-box testing algorithms to check conformance between Mealy machines, the theoretical (worst-case) complexities are high in order to achieve complete coverage. However, worst-cases do not always occur in a practical system. In particular, we need to identify scenarios that our algorithms can be made more efficient. For instance, using existing ideas of abstraction [12] , we might obtain a smaller but equivalent model of the host system before running the algorithms. We might also, using additional partial information about the component, to derive a smaller state number for the component and to find ways to expedite the model-checking process. Notice that the number is actually the state number for a minimal automaton that has the same set input/output sequences as the component. Additionally, in the implementation, we also need a database to record the test results that have been performed so far (so repeated testing can be avoided). Algorithms are needed to make use of the test results to aggressively trim the communication/witness graphs such that less test-cases are performed but the complete coverage is still achieved. Also, we will study algorithms to minimize communication/witness graphs such that duplicate test-cases are avoided. Lastly, it is also desirable to modify our algorithms such that the communication/witness graphs are generated with the process of generating test-cases and performing black-box testing over the unspecified component X. In this way, a dynamic algorithm could be designed to trim the graphs on-the-fly.
Coverage Metrics
Sometimes, a complete coverage will not be achieved when running the algorithms on a specific application system. In this case, a coverage metric is needed to tell how much the test-cases that have run so far cover. The metric will give a user some confidence on the partial model-checking results. Furthermore, such a metric would be useful in designing conservative algorithms to debug/verify the temporal specifications that sacrifice the complete coverage but still bring the user reasonable confidence.
More Complex System Models
The algorithms can be generalized to systems containing multiple unspecified components. Additionally, we will also consider cases when these components interacts between each other, as well as cases when the host system communicates with the components asynchronously. Obviously, when the unspecified component (as well as the host system) has an infinite-state space, both the traditional model-checking techniques and black-box techniques are not applicable. One issue with infinite-state systems is that, the in-ternal structure of a general infinite-state system can not be learned through the testing method. Another issue is that model-checking a general infinite-state system is an undecidable problem. It is desirable to consider some restricted classes of infinite-state systems (such as real-time systems modeled as timed automata [1] ) where our algorithms generalize. This is interesting, since through the study we may provide an algorithm for model-checking driven black-box testing for a real-time system that contains an (untimed) unspecified component. Since the algorithm will generate testcases for the component, real-time integration testing over the composed system is avoided. SCCcomm := {C|C is a nontrivial SCC of M and C contains some communication transitions };
B.2 Union of Labeling Functions
Procedure U nion(L1, L2) L := ∅; For each s ∈ dom(L1) ∪ dom(L2) Do If s ∈ dom(L1) ∩ dom(L2) Then If L1(s) = 1 ∨ L2(s) = 1 Then L := L ∪ {(s, 1)}; Else L := L ∪ {(s, L1(s) ∨ L2(s))}; End if Else if s ∈ dom(L1) Then L := L ∪ {(s, L1(s))}; Else L := L ∪ {(s, L2(s))}; End if: R s (s, t) Do N := N ∪ {s} If L1(t) = 1 ∧ R s env (s, t) Then If s ∈ dom(L) Then L := L ∪ {(s, 1)}; Else if L(s) = 1 Then L := L|s←1; End if Else if s ∈ dom(L) Then L := L ∪ {(s, id)};End for End for End if E:= {(s, s ′ )|s ′ ∈ dom(f ) ∧ ∃a : (s, a, s ′ ) ∈ Renv} ∪{(s, αβ, s ′ )|s ′ ∈ dom(f )∧(s, α, β, s ′ ) ∈ Rcomm};∈ T1 ∧ R s (s, t) Do If L1(s) = 1 ∧ L(t) = 1 ∧ R s env (s, t) Then If s ∈ dom(L) Then T2 := T2 ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, 1)}; Else if L(s) = 1 Then T2 := T2 ∪ {s}; L := L|s←1; End if Else if s ∈ dom(L) Then T2 := T2 ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, id)};
End if End for End while
N := dom(L); E := {(s, s ′ )|s, s ′ ∈ N ∧ ∃a : (s, a, s ′ ) ∈ Renv} ∪ {(s, αβ, s ′ )|s, s ′ ∈ N ∧ (s, α, β, s ′ ) ∈ Rcomm};L := {(s, 1)|∃C ∈ SCCenv : s ∈ C} ∪{(s, id)|∃C ∈ SCCcomm : s ∈ C} T := dom(L); While T = ∅ Do Choose t ∈ T ; T := T \ {t}; For each s ∈ dom(L1) ∧ R s (s, t) Do If L(t) = 1 ∧ L1(s) = 1 ∧ R s env (s, t) Then If s ∈ dom(L) Then T := T ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, 1)}; Else if L(s) = 1 Then T := T ∪ {s}; L := L|s←1; End if Else if s ∈ dom(L) Then T := T ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, id)}; End if End for End While N := dom(L); E := {(s, s ′ )|s, s ′ ∈ N ∧ ∃a : (s, a, s ′ ) ∈ Renv} ∪ {(s, αβ, s ′ )|s, s ′ ∈ N ∧ (s, α, β, s ′ ) ∈ Rcomm}; Associate id with G = N, E, L1 ; id := id + 1; Return L; End procedure
B.7 Testing an EX Graph
The algorithm for testing an EXgraph is simple. It first checks whether L1(s ′ ) can be evaluated true at any state s ′ such that the system can reach s ′ from s0 through an environment transition. It returns true if it is the case. Otherwise,it chooses one candidate from the set of all possible input symbols from s0, and feeds the sequence π concatenated with the input symbol to X. If the output symbol of X and the input symbol matches the annotation of an edge originating from the node, it moves forward to try the destination node of the edge. If there is no match, then it tries other candidates. But before trying any other candidate, it brings X to its initial state by sending it the special input symbol, reset. The algorithm returns f alse when all candidates are tried without a match. 
B.8 Testing an EU Graph
The procedure T estEU keeps a sequence of input symbols π that has been successfully accepted by X and an integer level that records how many communications have been gone through without reaching a destination state. And the algorithm works as follows. At first, it checks whether it has gone through more than mn communications without success, it returns false if it is the case. Then, it checks whether it has reached a destination state (i.e., s0 ∈ dom(L2)). If it is the case, it returns true when L2(s0) can be evaluated true s0. Next, it checks whether L1(s0) can be evaluated true at s0, it returns false if it is not the case. After that, it checks whether L1(s ′ ) can be evaluated true at any state s ′ such that the system can reach s ′ from s0 through an environment transition. It returns true if it is the case. Otherwise,it chooses one candidate from the set of all possible input symbols from s0, and feeds the sequence π concatenated with the input symbol to X. If the output symbol of X and the input symbol matches the annotation of an edge originating from the node, it moves forward to try the destination node of the edge with level increased by 1. If there is no match, then it tries other candidates. But before trying any other candidate, it brings X to its initial state by sending it the special input symbol, reset. The algorithm returns f alse when all candidates are tried without a match. 
B.9 Subroutine for Testing an EG Graph
The procedure SubT estEG keeps a sequence of input symbols that has been successfully accepted by X, an integer level that records how many communications have been gone through without reaching s f , and an integer count that indicates how many times s f has been reached. It first checks whether it has gone through more than mn communications without reaching s f , it returns false if it is the case. Then, it checks whether it has reached the given state s f . If it is the case, it returns true when it has already reached s f for m times, it increases count by 1 and resets level to 0 when otherwise. The next, it tests whether L1(s0) can be evaluated true at s0, and it returns false if it is not the case. After that it checks whether L1(s ′ ) can be evaluated true at any state s ′ such that the system can reach s ′ from s0 through an environment transition. It returns true if it is the case. Otherwise, it chooses one candidate from the set of all possible input symbols from s0, and feeds the sequence π concatenated with the input symbol to X. If the output symbol of X and the input symbol matches the annotation of an edge originating from the node, it moves forward to try the destination node of the edge with level increased by 1. If there is no match, it tries other candidates. But before trying any other candidate, it brings X to its initial state by sending it the special input symbol reset. The algorithm returns f alse when all candidates are tried without a match. To check whether (M, X) |= AG(s2 → AF s3), is equivalent to checking whether (M, X) |= ¬E[true U (s2 ∧ EG¬s3)].
Procedure
We describe how the formula
is processed by HandleCT L from bottom to up as follows.
1. the atomic subformula s2 is processed by HandleCT L, and a labeling function L1 = {(s2, 1)} is returned;
2. the atomic subformula s3 is processed, and a labeling function L2 = {(s3, 1)} is returned;
3. to process ¬s3, HandleN egation is called with L2 to return a labeling function L3 = {(s0, 1), (s1, 1), (s2, 1), (s4, 1)};
4. to process EG¬s3, HandleEG is called with L3 to construct an EG graph G1 = N, E, L3 with id 2 (see Figure  8 ) and return a labeling function L4 = {(s0, 2), (s1, 2), (s2, 2)}; s0 s1 s2 send/yes
Figure 8
5. to process s2∧EG¬s3, HandleN egation and HandleU nion are called with L1 and L4 to return a labeling function L5 = {(s2, 2)};
6. to process E[true U (s2 ∧ EG¬s3)], HandleEU is called with L5 to construct an EU graph G2 = N, E, L5 with id 3 (see Figure 9 ) and return a labeling function Since s0 is labeled by L f with an ID expression 3 instead of 1 (i.e., true), we need to test whether the ID expression 3 can be evaluated true at s0 by calling T estW G with s0 and G2. It's easy to see that, essentially T estW G would be testing whether some communication trace (with bounded length) with two consecutive symbol pairs (send yes) is a run of X. It returns f alse if such trace exists, or vice versa. We describe how the formula
C.2 Check
4. to process s2 ∧ ¬s3, HandleN egation and HandleU nion are called with L1 and L3 to return a labeling function L4 = {(s2, 1)};
5. to process E[¬s3U (s2 ∧ ¬s3)], HandleEU is called with L3 and L4 to construct an EU graph G1 = N, E, L3, L4 with id 2 (see Figure 10 ) and return a labeling function L5 = {(s0, 2), (s1, 2), (s2, 1)}; 6. to process EG¬s3, HandleEG is called with L3 to construct an EG graph G2 = N, E, L3 with id 3 (see Figure  11 ) and return a labeling function L6 = {(s0, 3), (s1, 3), (s2, 3)};
7. to process E[¬s3U (s2 ∧ ¬s3)] ∨ EG¬s3, HandleU nion is called with L5 and L6 to return a labeling function L7 = {(s0, 2 ∨ 3), (s1, 2 ∨ 3), (s2, 1)};
8. to process EX(E[¬s3U (s2 ∧¬s3)]∨EG¬s3), HandleEX is called with L7 to construct an EX graph G3 = N, E, L7 with id 4 (see Figure 12 ) and return a labeling function L8 = {(s0, 4), (s1, 1), (s2, 4), (s3, 4)}; s0 s1 s2 send/yes s3 Figure 12 9. to process s2∧EX(E[¬s3U (s2∧¬s3)]∨EG¬s3), HandleN egation and HandleU nion are called with L1 and L8 to return a labeling function L9 = {(s2, 4)};
10. to process E[true U (s2∧EX(E[¬s3U (s2∧¬s3)]∨EG¬s3))], HandleEU is called with L9 to construct an EU graph G4 = N, E, L5 with id 5 (see Figure 13 ) and return a labeling function L f = {(s0, 5), (s1, 5), (s2, 5), (s3, 5), (s4, 5)}.
Since s0 is labeled by L f with an ID expression 5 instead of 1 (i.e., true), we need to test whether the ID expression 5 can be evaluated true at s0 by calling T estW G with s0 and G4. It's easy to see that, essentially T estW G would be testing whether some communication trace (with bounded lengtg) with two consecutive symbol pairs (send yes) is a run of X. It returns f alse if such trace exists, or vice versa. 
